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RECENT BOOKS 
RESTITUTION AND REFORM 
.Dale A. Oesterle* 
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION. By George E. Palmer. Boston: Little, 
Brown. 1978. 4 vols. Pp. xxxv, 2,316. $180. 
In 1968 a distinguished legal scholar could write that "[i]t is a 
source of real regret" that there is no general treatise on the law of 
restitution in this country. 1 Professor George E. Palmer of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School now has filled the void splendidly 
with a four-volume treatment of the subject. The absence of such a 
treatise for so many years is remarkable, because knowledgeable ob-
servers of American law have recognized for over fifty years2 that 
restitution is a discrete body of legal and equitable rights and reme-
dies based on the principle of rectifying situations of unjust enrich-
ment.3 We are fortunate to have two early treatises, W. Keener, 
Quasi-Contract (1893) and P. Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Con-
tracts (1913), that introduce us to the threads of unjust enrichment in 
the common law. But no subsequent treatises developed the themes 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University. B.A. 1972, M.P.P. 1974, J.D. 1975, Uni-
versity of Michigan. - Ed. 
The author thanks his colleagues Alan Gunn, Robert B. Kent, Russel K. Osgood, and 
Robert S. Summers for their assistance in reviewing earlier drafts. 
I. Wade, The Literature of the Law of Restitution, 19 HAST. L.J. 1087, 1096 (1968). 
2. The Restatement of Restitution, published in 1937, combined in one text most of the 
legal and equitable remedies affording restitutionary relief. Only a few select sections on relief 
in connection with contracts were omitted, because the material had been previously prepared 
and published in the Restatement of Contracts (1932). See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 
§ 108 (1937) (referring to§§ 180-83, 347-57, 468, and 598-609 in the Restatement of Contracts). 
The Restatement of Restitution did not integrate fully the legal and equitable remedies around 
their common themes, however. Warren A. Seavey was the reporter for Part I of the Restate-
ment and Austin W. Scott was the reporter for Part II. The division between the Parts was 
based primarily on the law-equity dichotomy with the inevitable result that the two parts al 
times overlap and even conflict. Moreover, many of those portions of the Restatement that 
proposed advancements in existing doctrine have met with limited success. See, e.g., l G. 
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION§ 2.17 [hereinafter cited as G. PALMER without cross-
reference] (discussing the tracing rules of the Restatement,§§ 211 and 212). 
A second Restatement of Restitution is under way. Professor William F. Young of Colum-
bia University has been appointed the reporter. As of the date of writing of this review, no 
drafts of the second Restatement have been circulated. 
3. See J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 22-23 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 
§ I, Comments b and c (1937). 
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of these early works.4 Rather, apart from the Restatement of Restitu-
tion (1937) and its accompanying reporter's notes, we have had to 
consult treatises in a variety of fields - contracts, trusts, equity, 
fraud, remedies and damages5 - to obtain an enriching comparison 
of the application of the unjust enrichment concept in various cir-
cumstances. 6 Professor Palmer's treatise gathers, refines, and ex-
pands these scattered treatments. 
Restitution is a term that describes a variety of common-law 
rights that share the following features: (1) the defendant has been 
enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the defendant's enrichment is 
at the plaintiff's expense; and (3) it would be unjust to allow the 
defendant to retain the benefit. 7 If the three criteria are satisfied, the 
law requires that the defendant transfer the benefit, in specie or in 
value, to the plaintiff. For example,A tells his bookkeeper to mail a 
check to B. The bookkeeper misunderstands the directions and 
mails a check to C. A is entitled to restitution from C equal to the 
amount of the check.8 The definition hides intriguing problems: the 
meaning of "benefit" (where labor and materials have gone into the 
defendant's building pursuant to a construction contract and the 
contract is discharged by impossibility because a fire destroys the 
building before the work is completed, has the defendant bene-
fited?9); the meaning of "at the plaintiff's expense" (where the de-
fendant benefits through inducing a third party to break a contract 
with the plaintiff and the contract was a losing proposition for the 
4. I am not overlooking Professor John P. Dawson's important 1950 Julius Rosenthal lec-
tures at Northwestern University, published under the title UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1951). The 
lectures are a significant contribution to the literature on restitution, but their broad focus did 
not provide the systematic, methodical treatment of the subject that characterizes legal trea-
tises. 
5. E.g., M. BIGELOW, FRAUD, ch. 11, §§ 4, 5 (1877); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS §§ 472, 495, 497 
(1973); 5-6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS§§ 1107, 1112, 1372 (1963); D. DOBBS, REMEDIES§§ 4.1-
4.3 (1973); H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY§§ 118-23 (2d ed. 1948); C. McCORMICK, DAMAGES 448, 
458, 586, 626-27, 683 (1935); 4 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE§ 1044 (5th ed. 1941); A. 
SCOTT, TRUSTS§§ 462-64 (2d ed. 1956); 12 s. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1454 (3d ed. 1970). 
6. In 1966 two Englishmen, Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, published an excellent general 
treatise on English law, The Law of Restitution. English law, however, still does not recognize 
a general principle of unjust enrichment. See R. GOFF & G. JONES, THE LAW_ OF RESTITU-
TION 13 (2d ed. 1978). 
7. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I, Comments b and c (1937); R. GOFF & G. 
JONES, supra note 6, at 11-25. 
8. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 22, Comment a, Illustration 3 (1937). A is not enti-
tled to interest on the fund during the time that C has possession, however, even though C 
may have benefited by collecting the interest. See id. at § 156, Comment a. The rule on inter-
est needs reevaluation. If C profits from the use of A's money, C should restore to A the 
market value (market rate of interest) of the money if less than C's profit. If the interest is 
more than C's actual profit, C should restore only the profit, since C is an innocent converter. 
See note 83 infra. 
9. See, e.g., Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891). 
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plaintiff, can the plaintiff recover the defendant's benefit?10); and the 
meaning of unjust enrichment (where the plaintiff knowingly paid a 
debt a second time because he was unable to find documentation of 
the first payment, can he recover the second payment? 11). 
The selection of the term "restitution" to denote the category of 
rights defined by these criteria is perhaps unfortunate. 12 The term 
suggests a very limited list of remedies aimed at the restoration of 
circumstances to a previous state (restoration to the claimant of an 
item previously held by him, for example). The law of restitution 
deals with much more than this. Restitution, properly defined, af-
fords relief in cases in which the successful party claims something 
he did not have before. For example,A owes B $500 for purchased 
goods. A mistakenly believes that he purchased the goods from C 
and mails a check to C for $500. C cashes the check in the mistaken 
belief that it is payment on a debt that A formerly owed but in fact 
paid. B has a right to restitution from C, which is superior to any 
right to restitution that A has from C.13 It uncomfortably stretches 
the concept of restoration to argue that C restores A's property when 
recovery is enforced. 
Far more substantial problems than proper nomenclature, how-
ever, pervade the law of restitution. The cardinal outlines of this 
branch of law are in dispute. One seeking to gather various com-
mon-law rights in the restitution category must decide between a se-
lection based on historical derivation and a selection based purely on 
theory. A selection based on historical development includes the 
modem product of the common counts in general assumpsit and of 
the equitable doctrines of constructive trust, equitable lien, subroga-
tion, equitable accounting, and contribution and indemnity. Ex-
cluded are the common-law actions of trover, trespass to chattels, 
trespass for mesne profits, ~etinue, replevin and ejectment, 14 and the 
10. See, e.g., Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575 
(S.D.N.Y. 1920). Cf. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955) (constructive 
trust allowed when defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation did not cause the plaintiff a pecu-
niary loss). 
11. See, e.g., Shockley v. Wickliffe, 150 S.C. 476, 148 S.E. 476 (1929). The English refuse 
to recognize a law of restitution primarily because they believe that the principle of unjust 
enrichment is too vague to be of any practical value. See R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 6, 
at 11-13. 
12. Professor Palmer attributes the general usage of the term to the publication of the 
Restalemenl of Reslilulion in 1937. 1 G. PALMER at 4. 
13. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 126, Comment b, Illustration I (1937). 
14. For a discussion of the historical origin of these actions, see J. BAKER, AN lNTRODUC• 
TION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 49-61 (2d ed. 1979). 
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concept of negotiorum gestor in admiralty, 15 all of which may pro-
vide a form of restitutionary relief. The Restatement of Restitution 
favors this classification scheme, 16 and Professor Palmer, in his selec-
tion of topics for discussion in his treatise and in his occasional com-
ments on these other common-law actions, appears to continue in 
the Restatement tradition.17 On the other hand, a selection based 
purely on theory focuses on the three criteria noted above and in-
cludes all rights that allow for relief under circumstances satisfying 
the criteria. No one supports this latter position fully, although the 
writings of Robert Goff and Gareth Jones approach it. 18 Those who 
limit restitution to select, historically-derived actions, however, es-
pouse the liberal operation of the theory of restitution, free of an-
cient distinctions, within their chosen forms of action. 19 
Moreover, the essential theory of restitution, whatever its scope 
of application, itself exhibits severe definitional anomalies. For ex-
ample, one of the cornerstones of the theory is that the value of the 
relief awarded is measured by the value of the defendant's benefit, 
not by the value of the plaintiff's loss. In a "damage" action the 
plaintiff seeks to recover for the harm done to him; in a restitution 
action the plaintiff seeks to recover the gain acquired by the defen-
dant through the wrongful act. The difference serves to justify the 
existence of the restitutionary remedy and to distinguish it from the 
tort and the contract remedies where the restitutionary remedy and 
either a tort or a contract remedy are alternatively appropriate. Yet, 
the methods of measuring the defendant's gain in restitution actions 
often are a transparent pretense for awarding the plaintiff his loss 
and a measure of punitive damages. The latter part of this review 
will explain this problem in more detail.20 Other core definitional 
irregularities also exist. Another problem, which is not discussed 
15. See Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 14 HARV. L. REV. 817, 
863 (1961). 
16. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, ch. 7, Introductory Note (1937). The Restatement 
favored the distinction between tort actions and restitution actions with respect to survivorship, 
bankruptcy, statute of limitations and attachment. Restitution was analogized to those con-
tracts, enabling the claimant to take advantage of contract rules in these areas where different 
from rules applicable to torts. Lawmakers now recognize that these distinctions are unprinci-
pled vestiges of the old forms of action, and they are moving slowly to eliminate them. For an 
early criticism of the distinctions see Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in Assumpsit, l 9 YALE 
L.J. 221 (1910). 
17. For example, Professor Palmer's discussion of recovery in trespass for mesne profits 
indicates that he believes such an action to fall outside the scope of the law of restitution. 1 G. 
PALMER at 77. But see id. at 4 ("replevin of goods is sometimes a form of restitution"). 
18. R. GOFF & G. JONES, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
19. See, e.g., l G. PALMER at 4. 
20. See text at notes 71-92 in.fro. 
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here, is the elasticity of the concept of benefit.21 
In this definitional morass, Professor Palmer operates with re-
markable clarity. He begins his treatise modestly: 
Restitution has no well-defined boundaries because it is concerned 
with unjust enrichment, and that can appear in many places over al-
most the entire body of private law as well as in some parts of public 
law. I do not know whether a truly comprehensive treatment of resti-
tution can be written. The book is not comprehensive, partly because I 
do not have sufficient knowledge of many branches of the law. The 
book will have served its principal purpose if it contributes to an un-
derstanding of one of the important bases of legal liability: liability 
based in unjust enrichment.22 
What follows, however, is a herculean attempt at providing integrity 
to this neglected branch oflaw. The subsequent 2,316 pages of text 
discuss (with a notable exception)23 numerous and diverse problems 
in restitution that historically have troubled American courts. Pro-
fessor Palmer, by focusing on the venerable and classic questions in 
restitution, avoids grappling directly with the definition of restitu-
tion's outer limits. The approach requires, however, an extraordi-
nary range of text.24 While one can find select areas that deserve 
better treatment (I urge Professor Palmer to supplement his securi-
ties discussion),25 on the whole the treatise reflects a mastery of an 
21. See l G. PALMER at 44-47. 
22. l G. PALMER at xxxvii. 
23. The treatise contains no discussion of the restitutionary problems caused by a person of 
defective capacity who enters into a contract. The law on the topic may be subdivided by 
infancy, mental incapacity and undue influence. See, e.g., Eldridge v. May, 129 Me. 113, 150 
A. 378 (1930) (undue influence); Flach v. Gottschalk Co., 88 Md. 368, 41 A. 908 (1898) (mental 
incapacity); Sternlieb v. Normandie Natl. Sec. Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934) (in-
fancy). The Stemlieb court, for example, dealt with the restitutionary obligation of an infant 
who has disaffirmed an executed contract for the sale of stock. The topic could also include 
the old ultra vires doctrine: a contract entered into by a corporation to do acts beyond its 
capacity is void. Where there is performance by one party under the contract which benefits 
the other, the former may have a restitutionary remedy for the reasonable value of the benefits 
received by the latter. See, e.g., Central Transp. Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U.S. 24 
(1891). The ultra vires doctrine is currently respected in very few jurisdictions. 
24. The four volumes contain discussions of, among other things, issues dealing with: pat-
ents; copyrights; trademarks; trade secrets; rights of privacy; use of another's ideas; securities; 
trusts; estates; corporate officials; life, health and property insurance; fidelity and forgery insur-
ance; construction, loan and service contracts; good samaritans; admirality; agents; homestead 
property; stolen goods; mechanics liens; bankruptcy; fraud and deceit; real estate salesmen; 
occupational licensing; Sunday closing laws; gambling contracts; employment contracts; bet-
terment acts; inter vivos gifts; bequests; testamentary trusts; homicide; checks and notes; sover-
eign immunity; statutes of limitations; rules of pleading; trespass; and contribution and 
indemnity. 
25. Courts have applied restitutionary principles to Rule !0b-5 actions between partici-
pants in security sales transactions. See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 
U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (citing Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.$, 
879 (1965)) (defrauded seller); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(defrauded buyer). Professor Palmer discussedJanigan as a common-law fraud case, telling us 
in a footnote that it involves a !Ob-5 claim. l G. PALMER at 237 n.l 1. Yet we are told in a 
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astounding amount of material. 
Traditional divisions of civil law26 influence Professor Palmer's 
organization of the material. His major divisions are as follows: tort 
(and wrongs from breach of trust or other fiduciary obligation); 
fraud · and misrepresentation; breached, unenforceable, frustrated, 
and illegal contracts (often subdivided by the subject matter of the 
contract - real property, personal property, and services, for exam-
ple); duress; volunteers; mistake in business transactions, gifts or be-
quests; and three-party problems (restitution of a benefit transferred 
to the defendant by a third person and restitution from a defendant 
because of a payment to the third person).27 The material overlaps 
in the various sections, and a reader should take care to read all 
pertinent portions (which are easy to find because of Professor 
Palmer's excellent index in volume four).28 The repetition is due to 
Professor Palmer's attempt to discuss discretely and completely vari-
ous themes in restitution, such as legal history and three-party 
problems, that are not subject-matter specific. 
Unfortunately, Professor Palmer's valuable treatise may tum out 
to be under used, perhaps for reasons similar to those that explain 
the declining popularity of classes in restitution at American law 
schools. Law school curricula29 and statements by commentators30 
have led lawyers to regard the law oftort and contract (and, perhaps, 
later footnote that "the effect of federal regulation of the securities market on a damage action 
is outside the scope of this book. Some departures from co=on-law rules have occurred." 
Id. at 265 n.2. Professor Palmer cites Affiliated Ute in support, noting that co=on-law rules 
concerning causation have been altered. This understates the impact of the co=on-law theo-
ries on damage calculation in IOb-5 cases. 
An intriguing question is whether the co=on-law theories are helpful if a buyer or seller 
is suing someone other than an opposite party in a security sales transaction (for example, a 
defendant affects the market price of securities held by plaintiff by issuing misleading state-
ments, or a defendant procures a merger by a misleading proxy statement). Is a restitutionary 
award appropriate? See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 2425, 2426 (2d Cir. Dec. 
4, 1980); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., 
concurring in part). 
26. The term civil law is used to describe the body of law that regulates the conduct of 
persons in ordinary relations with each other. Civil law in this usage contrasts with criminal 
and administrative law. 
27. The organization of the treatise is similar to the organization of Professor Palmer's 
casebook. J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1969). Indeed, the trea-
tise is an excellent aid for those teaching from the casebook. The treatise also draws on Profes-
sor -Palmer's penetrating and comprehensive 1961 lectures on the doctrines of mistake. G. 
PALMER, MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1962). 
28. The index is not free from fault, however. First, it cites the reader to sections only, 
some of which are rather long. If the reference is to a narrow point, thumbing through an 
entire section can be aggravating. Second, it contains errors. For example, Professor Palmer's 
discussion of mesne profits is in§§ 2.5 and 2.12, yet the index cite is to § 1.5. 
29. Most law schools teach civil law in the first year through courses in tort, contracts, and 
property law. In these courses, restitution is rarely identified as a source of substantive rights. 
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fiduciary responsibility) as the principal source of civil liability at 
common law. Restitution is viewed solely as an alternative remedy 
for tortious conduct or breaches of contract. Why have a separate 
course ( or treatise) for restitution when it can be tacked on to a 
course ( or treatise) on torts or contracts? 
There are two ready answers. First, restitution must be separated 
from torts, contracts, and fiduciary responsibility because restitution 
can provide a right to relief when none of the other theories are help-
ful. A lawyer who lacks this knowledge can do an extreme disservice 
to clients who can recover ( or who are liable) only under restitution-
ary principles. For example, restitution alone gives relief to a mort-
gagee who voluntarily paid taxes to forestall foreclosure of a tax lien 
on the mortgaged property;31 to a person who has paid mistakenly a 
debt to the wrong person32 or a debt that he does not owe;33 and to a 
physician who provides emergency medical attention to a person un-
able to assent to the performance of the service.34 Even in contract 
cases where the contract is discharged without breach due to unen-
forceability, impossibility, or illegality, recovery of the value of any 
performance undertaken pursuant to the contract is based solely on 
restitutionary principles.35 Second, even if restitution is viewed pri-
marily as an alternative remedy for a tort or a breach of contract, the 
correct application of the restitutionary remedy depends on a clear 
understanding of the general principle of unjust enrichment.36 Often 
Usually, restitution is noted briefly, if at all, to be an alternative remedy for torts and breaches 
of contract. 
30. E.g., I G. PALMER at I (Our legal system has "split the whole field of civil obligations 
into contract objections and tort delegations.") (quoting Gilmore, Products Liability: A Com-
mentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103, 111 (1970)). 
31. See, e.g., Wyoming Bldgs. & Loan Assn. v. Mills Constr. Co., 38 Wyo. SIS, 269 P. 45 
(1928); 2 G. PALMER§ 10.5. 
32. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wood, 321 Mass. 519, 74 N.E.2d 141 (1947); 3 G. 
PALMER§ 14.23. 
33. See, e.g., McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 237 F. Supp. 874 (W.D.S.C. 1965); 3 G. PALMER 
§§ 14.8, 14.10 and 14.14. 
34. See, e.g., Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907); 2 G. PALMER § 10.4. 
35. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Santengelo, 137 Conn. 410, 78 A.2d 240 (1951) (illegal contract); 
Anderson v. Shattuck, 76 N.H. 240, 81 A. 781 (1911) (impossibility); Ford v. Stroud, 150 N.C. 
362, 64 S.E. I (1909) (unenforceable contract); 2 G. PALMER at chs. 6-8. The Uniform Com• 
mercial Code incorporates and modifies restitutionary rights when it deals with a contract for 
the sale of goods that is unenforceable because of the lack of a sufficient writing. See U.C.C. 
§ 2-201(3). 
36. Professor Palmer cautions against an overly literal adherence to this view: 
It is co=on to describe restitution as a remedy generally available for substantial breach 
of contract. This is useful as a point of departure, but at the same time it can be a danger-
ously misleading generalization. In some instances restitution will not be granted, no 
matter how important that breach. In other instances restitution is regularly granted with-
out requiring that the breach be substantial. 
I G. PALMER at 367-68 (footnote omitted). 
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judges and lawyers do not appreciate the full benefits of the restitu-
tionary alternative because they fail to distinguish properly the prin-
ciples behind the alternative from those of tort and contract 
doctrines. Now that Professor Palmer's treatise is available, attor-
neys will have little excuse for such a failure. 
Every teacher of restitutionary remedies has a favorite case for 
illustrating blunders made by lawyers who fail to understand restitu-
tion theory.37 Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 38 serves currently as 
my example. The plaintiff was a Sears sales clerk who at age eigh-
teen designed and constructed a "quick-release" ratchet wrench dur-
ing his off-duty hours. Two years later he assigned all his rights in 
the invention to Sears for a royalty of two cents per unit up to a 
maximum of ten thousand dollars. The wrench was an immediate 
success. Within days after the signing, Sears was manufacturing 
forty-four thousand quick release wrenches a week. In the next nine 
months Sears sold over a half-million of the wrenches and paid the 
plaintiff the maximum amount in the assignment agreement. Ten 
years after the assignment Sears had sold over nineteen million 
wrenches, and Sears continues to market the wrenches profitably to-
day. 
The plaintiff was understandably vexed by how small a share of 
the profits he had received. He filed suit against Sears in a federal 
district court four years after the assignment, arguing fraud, breach 
of confidential relationship, and negligent misrepresentation during 
negotiation of the assignment. At the core of the plaintiff's claims 
was the allegation that Sears grossly understated the value of the 
wrench during negotiations. 39 A jury found for the plaintiff on each 
of the three theories of liability and awarded one million dollars as 
recompense. 
A bizarre series of motions and appeals followed. Dissatisfied 
with the size of the jury verdict (plaintiff ha~. introduced evidence 
that Sears had made over forty-four million dollars in profits from 
37. Professor Palmer has used Millen v. Gulesian, 229 Mass. 27, 118 N.E. 267 (1918). J. 
DAWSON & G. PALMER, supra note 27, at 462. 
38. 573 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 860 (1978), on remand 573 F. Supp. 
372,(N.D. Ill. 1979), remanded 617 F.2d 460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, IOI S. Ct. 386 (1980). 
39. Sears's lawyer overstated probable costs of production, understated probable gross 
sales, and cast doubt on the patentability of the invention. Sears made the representations in 
the face of private studies to the contrary, and in the face of plans to incorporate the invention 
in approximately seventy-five percent of all its wrenches sold. Moreover, Sears had induced 
plaintiff's patent counsel to inform Sears directly on the status of patent applications on the 
invention. As a consequence, Sears knew before the assignment was executed, but the plaintiff 
did not, that patents had been granted on the invention. 573 F.2d at 979 n.l. 
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the invention),40 the plaintiff :filed a post-trial motion asking for re-
scission of the assignment and restitution of Sears's profits. He ar-
gued that the district court, sitting as a court of equity, should accept 
the jury's determination of liability, but should disregard the damage 
verdict on the equitable counts of fraud and breach of confidential 
relationship.41 The district court denied the motion, holding that the 
plaintiff had elected his legal remedies on all the.counts by taking the 
case to the jury. On appeal the Seventh Circuit remanded, ordering 
the district court to consider whether the patents should be returned 
to the plaintiff as of the date of judgment.42 The circuit court's 
careless use of the terms rescission and restitution, however, led the 
district court to reopen the entire case for an equitable accounting of 
all of defendant's profits after the wrongful acquisition of the rights 
to the invention. Sears appealed, and the Seventh Circuit clarified 
its earlier opinion, holding that the plaintiff had elected a damage 
remedy for past injury by submitting his claims .to a jury, but that the 
election did not prohibit him from asking for relief from future in-
jury. The court found that the best relief from future injury con-
sisted of ordering the return of the patents to the plaintiff retroactive 
to the time of the trial court judgment.43 Since that judgment was 
three years old at the time of the second circuit court opinion, the 
plaintiff was left with a right to sue Sears for damages caused by 
Sears's three years of infringement of the patents,44 and the right to 
exploit the patents for their remaining years of life. Sears promptly 
announced that it would defend any patent infringement suit on the 
40. The plaintiff had presented evidence that Sears earned "an incremental net profit of 
$44,032,082 from its use of his invention." Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 471 F. Supp. 372, 
382 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Sears disputed the figure. 573 F.2d at 984 n.7. 
41. In Illinois, only co=on law damages could be recovered for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. See Wilkinson v. Appleton, 28 Ill. 2d 184, 190 N.E.2d 727 (1963); McAfee v. Rockford 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 521, 526-27, 352 N.E.2d 50, 54-55 (1976). 
42. Based on the jury instruction, plaintiff will receive one million dollars as the measure 
of past profits earned by Sears up to the time of trial. That award, however, is not incon-
sistent with return of the patent so that plaintiff can receive the future benefits of the 
patent that Sears fraudulently acquired. 
573 F.2d at 985. 
43. Judge Swygert dissented, arguing that the plaintiff was entitled to an accounting for 
Sears's profits from the time of the jury verdict to the present. 617 F.2d at 466. 
44. In 1952, Congress amended the federal statute controlling patent infringement actions, 
eliminating recovery of profits from the patent infringer. The patentee is now limited to a 
damage remedy. See ARO Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 
(1964) (plurality of four Justices); Foster v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 
1320-21 (2d Cir. 1974); Zegers v. Zegers, Inc., 458 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1972); Georgia Pac. Corp. 
v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 514-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). So, in essence, the 
plaintiff was not given "future profits," but rather a damage remedy through a cause of action 
co=encing at the time of the initial trial court judgment. At the time of the writing of this 
Review, the plaintiff had not yet filed the second suit. 
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grounds that the patents were invalid.45 
The plaintiff, the trial judge, and the Seventh Circuit all could 
have benefited from a careful reading of Palmer's treatise.46 The 
plaintiff made two serious errors. First, he failed to realize that he 
was facing one case in which it was important to decide early in the 
proceedings whether he was affirming or disaffirming the transfer of 
rights to the invention. Palmer's treatise would have warned him: 
If the plaintiff has transferred title to property to the defrauding party 
in performance of the contract, and the latter still has the property, 
there is an inescapable difference between a claim for the return of the 
property, and a claim for damages which does not call for such return 
but instead rests on a choice made by the plaintiff to allow the transfer 
of title to stand.47 
An election of the damages remedy, affirming the transfer of the in-
vention, entitled the plaintiff to compensation for the injury actually 
sustained, in this case the market value of the patent at the time of 
the wrongful transfer minus the proceeds he received on the transfer. 
On the other hand, an election of the restitutionary remedy, disaf-
firming the transfer of the invention, entitled the plaintiff, upon 
tendering the proceeds he received on the transfer, to either an ac-
tion to secure the patents in specie or in value (measured as of the 
time of the wrongful appropriation) unlimited by the contract price. 
Moreover, if the restitutionary remedy was elected, the plaintiff 
would be entitled to an accounting of the defendant's profits during 
the period of wrongful use. In the Sears case, the restitutionary rem-
edy clearly was preferable.48 
The plaintiff, however, allowed the case to go to the jury on a 
confused instruction without a clear and reasoned objection.49 A 
45. Judge Swygert, dissenting, viewed this announcement with considerable distaste: 
At oral argument, counsel for Sears categorically asserted that the patents were invalid -
despite the evidentiary fact that the quick release wrenches which Sears has sold and is 
selling all bear the patent number. Such a cavalier attitude reflects cynicism on the part of 
Sears in its business relations with the public. 
Slip Op. at 13. n.• (the reported opinion does not carry the footnote). 
46. The treatise was not published when the plaintiff made his fatal election or when the 
Seventh Circuit decided the first appeal. 
47. l G. PALMER at 273. "Damages" refers to a common-law money judgment rendered to 
compensate the plaintiff for loss or harm caused by the defendant. A person who has a right to 
restitution can obtain a money judgment equal to the benefit unjustly obtained by the defen-
dant at the expense of the plaintiff. Some refer to such a money judgment in restitution as 
"damages,'' but this usage is historically inaccurate and confuses the separate remedies. 
48. The plaintiff recognized that "[I]n this case the difference between petitioner's damages 
and Sears's profits is potentially great." Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 80-337, Petition 
by Roberts for a Writ of Certiorari, at 22, (U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1980). 
49. The district judge refused to instruct the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to an ac-
counting for the profits Sears had acquired by its fraud. The judge dictated an alternate in-
struction that was typed and submitted by the plaintiff. Sears argued on appeal that the 
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proper damage instruction would have granted the plaintiff recovery 
based on his total loss from the wrongful appropriation of the pat-
ents (the market value of the patents at the- time of the assignment); 
the profits Sears made and would make on the invention were evi-
dence on the amount of the loss. so A proper restitutionary instruc-
tion would have charged the jury to award the plaintiff all past 
profits made by the defendant on the invention and the value of the 
patents at the time of the assignment (if the plaintiff had not elected 
to request the patents be returned in specie). The actual instruction 
used the term "damages" but did not give the market value standard 
of valuation; rather the instruction noted only that the jury "may" 
award past profits.sI It was neither a true damage instruction nor a 
true restitutionary instruction; rather it was a hybrid.s2 The Seventh 
plaintiff did not object to the alternate instruction. The plaintiff argued that he had objected. 
The record is ambiguous. In handing the judge the alternative instruction plaintiff's counsel 
noted: "I will just say for the record, your Honor, this is being submitted because of the 
Court's ruling that the jury should not be instructed that they had to bring in profits." Roberts 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 80-337, Petitioner's Reply to Response to Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari, at 4 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. 1980). Moreover, the; plaintiff did not object to the instruc-
tion as constituting an improper damage instruction. See note 47 infra. The circuit court 
held that "[h]aving let the case go to the jury without getting the issue clarified, plaintiff should 
not be heard to complain about the outcome of that procedure." 617 F.2d at 463. 
50. The profits may afford evidence of the value of the patents. C.f. Atlas-Pacific Engr. Co. 
v. Geo. W. Ashlock Co., 339 F.2d 288, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1964) (infringer's net profits are evi-
dence of patent holder's loss of profits), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 842 (1965). The weight of such 
evidence is often highly conjectural. The market value of the patents will reflect the profit 
projections held by market participants at the time of the wrongful appropriation. Expected 
profits, however, are not the same as actual profits, which would probably not be known with 
certainty in the market at the time of wrongful appropriation. Actual profits, therefore, are 
evidence of expected profits only when the prejudicial effect of hindsight knowledge can be 
discounted. C.f. Brian Jackson Assocs. v. San Manuel Copper Co., 305 F. Supp. 66 (D. Ariz. 
1969) (calculation of reasonable royalties based on an analysis not of profits but of the royalty 
rate parties would have agreed upon had they bargained freely). 
51. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows: 
If you find in favor of the plaintiff upon either the first or second claim, then, one of the 
elements of the money damages to be considered by you may be the net value to the 
defendant of the profits and benefits derived from the use of plaintiff's invention. The 
award of money damages you make may equal the net profits which you find the defen-
dant gained as a result of its merchandising of wrenches incorporating plaintiff's Quick 
Release invention and idea, minus any expenditures which you find the defendant has 
proved it incurred had it not merchandised such wrenches incorporating plaintiff's Quick 
Release invention and idea from the time of the contract in question to the present. 
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 1980). 
Roberts argued on appeal that this was a damage instruction; Sears argued that it was a 
restitution instruction. Interestingly, damage instructions were held to a much higher standard 
of accuracy in older cases. For example, cases from the tum of the century have held "value" 
or "reasonable value" inadequate substitutes for ''market value" in instructions to juries. See, 
e.g., Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Sweeney, 166 Ky. 360, 179 S.W. 214 (1915); Texas & 
N.O.R. Co. v. Turner, 199 S.W. 868 (fex. Civ. App. 1917). 
52. The trial judge appeared to have derived the instruction from a sample instruction for 
patent infringement cases found in w. MATHES & E. DEVIIT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 86.37, at 575-76 (1965). The sample instruction was a damage instruction. 
See note 51 supra. Ironically the instruction actually given the jury by the trial judge has been 
cited by the subsequent edition of the book as an illustration of instructions given in non-
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Circuit, in essence, construed the instruction as a limited damage in-
struction for the value of the loss of use of the invention from the 
date of the assignment to the date of trial. Of course, the standard of 
damages that should have been given the jury under the circuit 
court's theory was a reasonable royalty standard. Since the jury was 
not instructed on the essential method of calculating such a damage 
remedy, it is hard to say with confidence that the jury did in fact 
what the circuit court held that it did.53 
The plaintiff's second error came after he recognized that the 
jury was to receive a damage instruction. He assumed incorrectly 
that a damages verdict would not preclude a post-verdict request to 
the judge for equitable restitutionary relief - rescission of the as-
signment and an accounting of profits. The trial judge, in accor-
dance with Illinois law, 54 held that the plaintiff had elected 
irrevocably his legal remedies and could not ask for any form of 
equitable relief. The Seventh Circuit came partially to the plaintiff's 
aid by holding that a claim for a return of the patent as of the date of 
the entry of the judgment was not a mutually inconsistent remedy. 
The Seventh Circuit ruled that a damages verdict forecloses only 
claims for restitution for the time period explicitly covered by the 
verdict.55 The court was willing to look beyond a simple law/equity 
dichotomy in applying the election of remedies doctrine. It inter-
preted the jury instruction in issue to contain a time limitation (the 
jury was instructed to award only damages for pre-trial or "past" 
injury)56 and saddled the plaintiff with his damage election only for 
the period so included. 
infringement actions for fraud and deceit in which restitutionary relief is recoverable. 3 E. 
DEVIIT & C. BLACKMAR~ FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS§ 83.01 (3d ed. Supp. 
1979). Since federal district judges rely heavily on this book for guidance, it appears that the 
trial judge's errors in Roberts will be often repeated. In any event, the record demonstrates 
that the trial judge believed he was instructing under a damages theory. See Petitioner's Re-
ply, supra note 49, at pp. 3-4. 
53. The jury was given a reasonable royalty instruction on count three dealing with negli-
gent misrepresentation. Since the jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of one million dollars 
for each count, perhaps it did award something equivalent to a reasonable royalty for counts 
one and two. See note 84 i'!fra. 
54. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460,464 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Altom v. 
Hawes, 63 Ill. App. 3d 659, 380 N.E.2d 7 (1978)); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 
976, 985 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Carr v. Arnold, 239 Ill. 37, 87 N.E. 870 (1909)). 
55. Illinois law is to the contrary. Illinois not only precludes recovery of profits for loss of 
use, but also bars a return of the patents as of the date of entry of the trial court judgment. 617 
F.2d at 465 (citing Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. First Natl. Bank of Chicago, 107 Ill. App. 2d 
204, 211, 246 N.E.2d 96, 99-100 (1969)). The Illinois position is arguable: If the plaintiff elects 
his damage remedy, damages instructions should include relief for all relevant time periods. If 
a time period is omitted, the plaintiff is bound unless he properly objects to the omission. 
56. In fact, the damage instruction suggested, but did not mandate, a time limitation. 
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The Seventh Circuit misunderstood the law of restitution as well. 
It incorrectly held that the plaintiff had elected his damages remedy 
for "past" injury merely by asking for a jury trial. 57 A reading of 
Palmer's treatise would make it clear that, because the plaintiff had a 
right to restitutionary relief on the fraud count through the legal 
remedy of quasi-contract, he was entitled to a jury trial on a quasi-
contract theory.58 A quasi-contract count based on the fraudulent 
procurement of the patents supports a request for both an award of 
the value of the patents when wrongfully taken and an accounting of 
all profits obtained by the defendant attributable to the wrongful use 
of patents.59 Accounting is available in actions at law.60 Any elec-
tion for a damage judgment must be based on the plaintiff's failure 
to insist that a proper quasi-contract instruction be submitted to the 
jury, and not merely on the plaintiff's desire for a jury trial. 
Finally, both the trial court and the Seventh Circuit (albeit for 
different reasons),61 applied the doctrine of election ofremedies with 
unnecessary harshness. Although the plaintiff could not have been 
awarded both damages and restitutionary relief on his claims be-
cause he would receive double compensation for his injury, Palmer's 
treatise explains that it is unreasonable to hold the plaintiff to a final 
57. The trial judge apparently made a similar ruling. The plaintiff claimed that the trial 
judge refused to give a restitution instruction because the court ruled that the plaintiff had 
elected to recover damages by asking for a jury trial. Petition, supra note 48, at 11. 
58. l G. PALMER§§ 1.2, l.5(c), 3.3, 3.7. The trial court apparently initiated the mistake, 
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 471 F. Supp. 372, 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ("the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment is an equitable one, damages is a legal remedy"). See also Roberts v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1980). 
59. See l G. PALMER at 237. 
60. Accounting is cognizable in actions at law unless the case is so complicated that an 
account can be unraveled satisfactorily only by a court of equity. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc, 
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478, 480-81 (1962) (Black, J., with three Justices concurring; Harlan 
and Douglas, J.J., concurring); Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 1253 (3d Cir. 1969). 
Justice Black in J)airy Queen stated that in view of the power of district courts to appoint 
masters under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b) to assist a jury, "it will be a rare case" in 
which an accounting is too complicated for a jury. 369 U.S. at 478. But cf. W. KEENER, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 166 (1893) and P. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF 
QUASI-CONTRACTS§ 274 (1913) (recovery of profits possible only through equitable account-
ing, not quasi-contract), criticized in l G. PALMER at 158-59. 
A claim for a restitution of the patents in specie, rather than for restitution of their value, 
however, may only be available in equity. See Howard v. Howe, 61 F.2d 577, 578 (7th Cir. 
1932) (constructive trust imposed on patents procured by fraud and breach of confidential 
relations); Saho v. Delman, 286 App. Div. 238, 142 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1955), revd, 3 N.Y.2d 155, 
143 N.E.2d 906, 164 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1957) (claim for rescission of patent assignment and reas-
signment of patents). Cf. Ripka v. Philco Corp., 65 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), ajfd, 154 
F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1946) (securities). 
61. The trial judge felt bound by the Illinois law on election of remedies. The Seventh 
Circuit recast the law on election of remedies, asserting that the state rule had to give way to a 
federal procedural solution. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 462-63 (7th Cir. 
1980). 
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choice of the damage remedy when a change to the restitutionary 
remedy or trial on both in the alternative would not have unduly 
surprised the defendant. 62 Since the Roberts plaintiff had asked for 
both remedies from the beginning of the lawsuit, the only real dan-
ger was double recovery. The trial court erred both in refusing to 
allow the jury to consider, in the alternative, the inconsistent restitu-
tionary and damage claims on two of the three counts (the trial court 
did allow the jury to determine the three damage counts in the alter-
native), 63 and in holding that the plaintiff's jury trial request consti-
tuted an irrevocable election of the damage remedy on those two 
counts. The Seventh Circuit erred in affirming the election. 
The Seventh Circuit and the trial court were waylaid by the per-
ceived problems associated with a discriminatory application of the 
plaintiff's right to (and the defendant's right to be free from) a jury 
trial. To preserve the restitutionary claims in counts one and two, 
the Seventh Circuit apparently would require the plaintiff either to 
drop the jury demand on all counts (including count three, which 
supported no alternative restitutionary theory of recovery)64 or to 
drop the jury demand on counts one and two, proceed to the jury on 
count three alone, and ask for a bench trial on counts one and two. 
The first alternative seems to violate the thrust of the following lan-
guage of Ross v. Bernhard:65 
Under those cases [Beacon and .Dairy Queen] where equitable and le-
gal claims are joined in the same action, there is a right to jury trial on 
the legal claims which must not be infringed either by trying the legal 
issues as incidental to the equitable ones or by a court trial of a com-
mon issue existing between the claims. 
The second alternative would give the plaintiff a choice on how to 
order the trial. Either the jury trial or the bench trial could go first, 
with the second trial subject to the collateral estoppel effects of the 
first.66 Given the choice, the plaintiff probably would have chosen to 
62. See l G. PALMER§ 2.4. 
63. See note 84 iefra. 
64. Unfortunately, Professor Palmer's treatment of the jury trial right is one of the few 
areas that deserves a more comprehensive analysis. See l G. PALMER at 28-29. 
65. 396 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1970). See also Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d II 19 (5th 
Cir. 1978); Bruce v. Bohanon, 436 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 (1971). 
66. The judge could minimize the burdens of a two-stage hearing by charging the jury on 
both the legal and equitable counts. The verdict on the damage count would be binding and 
the verdict on the equitable counts would be advisory. See Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. 
Pa. 1940) ("a more desirable solution - one in which the court could try the case with a jury 
and, in the event that legal relief is appropriate, could treat the jury's verdict as bind-
ing .... "). See generally 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ~~ 38.18, at 165 n.5; 38.17. Cf. 
Morris, Ju,y Trial Under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 427, 435-36 
(1942) (delay calling jury until legal relief is sought). 
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have a jury determine liability on the third count first and then have 
the judge try the other two counts (perhaps with an advisory jury), 
giving consideration to the collateral estoppel effects of the jury ver-
dict. Since the third count on negligent misrepresentation had sub-
stantial overlap with the first two counts based on fraud and 
confidential relation, a favorable jury verdict on the third count 
would substantially doom the defense on the first two counts. More-
over, the jury verdict on the third count would be alternative to (and 
not added with) the judge's award on either of the first two counts. 
In light of the need for a two-part proceeding in Roberts even if the 
doctrine of election of remedies is applied, and in light of the irra-
tionality of allowing the plaintiff some alternative remedies but not 
others based solely on anachronism, 67 a sensible approach would be 
to allow Roberts the procedure he in essence sought - a jury trial on 
damages on all counts and a subsequent bench trial (subject to the 
collateral estoppel effects of the jury verdict) on the equitable theo-
ries on counts one and two, with the recovery on any one award not 
cumulated with any other. 
The Roberts case illustrates the need for a clear, comprehensive 
study of the American law of restitution that Palmer's treatise pro-
vides. Palmer's treatise speaks to the issue that confounded the liti-
gants and the courts in Roberts. The treatise is, however, more than 
a mere catalogue of restitutionary doctrines that can be consulted to 
minimize Roberts-type mistakes. Its real value, perhaps, lies in Pro-
fessor Palmer's struggle with the central problem of restitutionary 
theory, the need to divorce the principles of unjust enrichment from 
the outmoded legacies of early English cases and to reform the doc-
trine in its new setting. 
The law of restitution has two major stems: the common law of 
quasi-contract (including the indebitatus assumpsit common counts 
for money had and received, for money paid, for goods sold and 
delivered - quantum va!ebant, and for work and labor done -
quantum menlit) and the equitable doctrines of constructive trust, 
equitable lien, subrogation, equitable accounting, and contribution 
and indemnity. The law of quasi-contract grew out of the action of 
assumpsit, which also spawned modem contract law. A promise to 
67. Rules 8 and 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourage the plaintiff to seek 
both legal and equitable relief in the same complaint, even if the claims are mutually inconsis-
tent. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1044, at 152 
(1969) ("rules that put plaintiffs to an election of remedies no longer are applicable .. ; ."). 
C.f. Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207, 213 (1918) ("at best this doctrine of election of 
remedies is a harsh, and now largely obsolete rule, the scope of which should not be ex-
tended .... "). 
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pay or restore was fictitiously "implied" in certain circumstances to 
give appropriate relief. The equitable doctrines grew out of the law 
of fiduciary relations and the law of suretyship. As a consequence, it 
took many years for restitution to shed restricting analogies to con-
tract, trust, and suretyship doctrines in favor of a general principle 
redressing instances of unjust enrichment.68 The early history of the 
law of restitution in America reflects this struggle to liberate the 
principles of restitution from their infant cradles. 69 Professor Palmer 
chronicles this evolution and criticizes the jurisdictions that are out 
of step with the movement. 70 
Our current problem, however, is to redefine the law of restitu-
tion in its new context. Early restitutionary doctrines provided 
broad and powerful remedies for select cases; current restitutionary 
doctrine threatens to provide these expansive remedies in a wide 
range of cases, not all of which can accommodate equitably the full 
breadth of relief afforded by traditional restitutionary theory. For 
example, the doctrine of constructive trust originated in actions 
against fiduciaries, and included the principles of tracing (that is, of 
tracking down the product of improperly held money or property 
and delivering that product to the beneficiary). Now we have ex-
tracted the constructive trust remedy from the fiduciary context and 
applied it generally; we have continued, however, to include the 
principles of tracing within the remedy, thereby applying tracing to 
situations where it is inappropriate. Professor Palmer, in dealing 
with the individual applications of restitutionary principles, often 
suggests that restitutionary remedies should be limited according to 
the equities present in specific circumstances. I applaud his efforts, 
but I believe that the limits of restitutionary relief can be genera-
lized, and contours of the restitution doctrine itself reformed. Two 
places where reform should begin are the restitutionary rules on 
profit apportionment and tracing. 
For an example of the deficiencies of profit apportionment in res-
68. English law has not progressed very far beyond the early precedents. For example, 
constructive trusts can be used only in connection with actual fiduciary relationships. See, e.g., 
In re Diplock, [1948] I Ch. 465, 530 (Ch. App.). 
69. See generally J. DAWSON, supra note 3. 
70. The position taken in Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 285 (1827), is an example of 
confusion produced by the growth of quasi-contract out of a contract form of action. The case 
held that there is no recovery in quasi-contract for conversion unless the goods in issue had 
been sold. The court believed that quasi-contract allowed it to imply a contract of agency 
between the tortfeasor and the victim only if the tortfeasor sold the converted item (the sale 
was made "on behalf' of the victim). Since assumpsit was a contract form of action, some-
where in the facts there had to be an express contract. "The case illustrates the early failure (of 
which we are not yet wholly free) to separate quasi contract from actual contract." I G. 
PALMER at 54. The case is still followed in a few states. Id. at 55. 
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titution, consider again the facts of Roberts. If the plaintiff had 
properly argued and proved his restitutionary remedy, should he 
have received all Sears's profits on his invention, a figure in excess of 
sixty million dollars? Surely the manufacturing, marketing and pro-
motional efforts of Sears were significant factors in the accumulation 
of such profits. As noted by Professor Palmer, a very difficult prob-
lem in the law of restitution is the determination of whether the de-
fendant's profits are solely the product of the plaintiff's interest or 
rather are the product of contributions made by the defendant.71 
While generalizations in this area are inherently suspect, courts ap-
pear willing to apportion profits if the defendant contributed money 
or some other tangible interest to the plaintiff's interest and thereby 
produced a gain, 72 but they refuse to consider contributions of exper-
tise or other services by the defendant.73 
For example, consider the relief available from a bailee who mis-
appropriates ten dollars he is holding for the bailor and adds ten of 
his own to create an investment fund of twenty dollars, and who then 
pays out of the fund a ten-dollar commission to a third person for 
investment services on the remaining ten dollars. If the investment 
produces a net profit of six dollars (that is, if the investment appreci-
ates to a value of twenty-six dollars), the bailee must pay the plain-
tiff-bailor the misappropriated ten dollars plus one-half of the net 
profits (three dollars) - a total of thirteen dollars. Yet, a second 
bailee who misappropriates ten dollars and adds ten dollars worth of 
personal time (he has investment expertise) to produce a net profit of 
six dollars must pay the plaintiff the original ten dollars and all the 
gross profits (sixteen dollars) - a total of twenty-six dollars. The 
second bailee, although he has put the value of his time at risk, 
neither is reimbursed for his time nor shares74 in the profits attrib-
utable to his services. 
The old saw is that to permit the second bailee to recover for his 
services and their income would be to allow the "wrongdoer to profit 
from his wrong." This assumes, however, that the wrongdoer in-
71. l G. PALMER§ 2.12. 
72. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1939). Cf. Scott, 
Following the Res and Sharing the Product, 66 HARV. L. REV. 872, 873 (1953); Scott, The Righi 
to Follow Money Wrongfully Mingled with Other Money, 27 HARV. L. REV. 125 (1913). The 
statement assumes that there is no evidentiary problem in apportioning the contributions. This 
is often not the case, and the issue of which party has the burden of proof is often decisive. 
13. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 663-64 (1888). But see Brooks v. Conston, 364 
Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950) (credit given for value of services of wrongdoer; the profit, however, 
was not apportioned between the services and the misappropriated assets). 
74. Assuming that the defendant's time and the stolen fund contributed proportionally by 
value to the formation of the profit, the bailee should get half of the net profits or three dollars. 
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curred no significant opportunity costs in performing the services in 
issue; that is, that the wrongdoer could not have otherwise made 
profitable use of his ability to provide the services. Awarding unap-
portioned profits against the second bailee, if the bailee could have 
otherwise used the time that he expended on the stolen fund, is in 
essence a penalty equal to the value of his time, not a disgorgement 
of a benefit unjustly held at the plaintiff's expense.75 Although a 
penalty in these circumstances often may be justified, 76 it should not 
masquerade under the guise of a doctrine aimed at denying the de-
fendant benefits unjustly received at the expense of the plaintiff. 
Moreover, awarding punitive damages through a formula tied to the 
defendant's overall gain is irrationally inflexible; the gain may not 
approximate the amount necessary to punish the defendant eff ec-
tively. 77 
The application of these simplistic apportionment rules to the 
Roberts case leads to troublesome results. In Roberts the plaintiff 
offered evidence of the increment of Sears's net profits on the wrench 
attributable to the misappropriated invention, those profits that were 
gained on wrenches incorporating the quick release device minus 
profits that Sears would have made on a line of wrenches without the 
device. Thus the plaintiff attempted to apportion the profits between 
those attributable to the use of the patented idea and those attributa-
ble to the remainder of the wrench. Although it appears that the 
expenses of manufacturing, marketing, and promotion were de-
ducted in ascertaining profits (arguably some of these expenses could 
have been disallowed), 78 the profits directly attributable to these ef-
forts were not deducted. Sears's argument, if any, that its marketing 
and distribution expertise was largely responsible for the profits, 
would probably have been ignored. The current law of restitution 
appears to support the plaintiff's calculations. Sears would have be-
come an at-cost ( or below cost) manufacturing, marketing, and dis-
tributing agent for the plaintiff even though Sears had put a 
substantial amount of its capital at risk. 
15. See Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property 
or the Commission ofa Wrong, SO CoLUM. L. REV. 504,552 (1980). 
76. Courts occasionally have awarded exemplary damages in addition to restitution. See, 
e.g., Millar v. James, 254 Cal. App. 2d 530, 62 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967); Mooneyham v. Comisk, 
294 S.W. 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). q. Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 
510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802,933 (1975) (exemplary damages allowed for 
the wrongful acquisition of trade secrets). Restitution actions themselves, however, are typi-
cally understood not to be punitive. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 149 (1937). 
77. See Friedmann, supra note 75, at 552. 
78. The value of Sears's in-house marketing and promotional efforts should not have been 
deducted. See note 73 supra and accompanying text. 
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The apportionment problem has appeared in other cases. In 
Otwell Nye & Nissen Co. ,79 for example, the defendant converted 
and put to use a machine that the plaintiff had stored and neglected. 
The court awarded the plaintiff recovery based on the defendant's 
saving of expenditure as a result of the use of the machine. The 
award was markedly higher than the market value of the machine 
itself. The recovery for three years' use amounted to $11,560, though 
the plaintiff had offered to sell the machine to the defendant for only 
$600 in the early stages of the controversy. The court failed to take 
into account the defendant's contribution of his expertise in employ-
ing the machine to its fullest advantage in a going enterprise. The 
restitutionary award therefore provided the plaintiff with the benefit 
of the defendant's expertise at no cost. 
Professor Palmer and I approach this apportionment problem 
somewhat differently. Professor Palmer, not content with Otwell, so 
finds: 
no easy formulas by which such problems [of apportioning the profits 
between those attributable to plaintiff's interests and defendant's con-
tributions] can be decided; instead, the court must resort to general 
considerations of fairness, taking into account the nature of the defen-
dant's wrong, the relative extent of his contribution, and the feasibility 
of separating this from the contribution traceable to the plaintiff's in-
terest. 81 
To avoid excessive awards like those in Otwell and (potentially) 
in Roberts, I favor limiting a plaintiff's restitutionary award to the 
market value of the wrongfully appropriated interest. Such a rule 
would include consideration of the factors that concern Professor 
Palmer, but would add coherence and structure to the inquiry.82 If 
the plaintiff regains the subject matter of the controversy in specie, 
he is entitled to the market value of its use plus interest at market 
79. 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946). 
80. 1 G. PALMER at 161. 
81. Id 
82. Moreover, I suspect that Professor Palmer and I disagree on how profits should be 
awarded in at least one type of case. See l G. PALMER§ 2.12. A steals a widget from B. A 
rents the widget to third parties to acquire profits. After the theft, an unanticipated market 
change (widget makers cannot get Iranian clay, a key ingredient) causes the market value of 
widgets to rise, and A is able to raise substantially his widget rental price. Before the lawsuit 
begins, the widget is destroyed. The market value formula, applied at the time of conversion, 
will not reflect the unanticipated market change. Yet, it is hard to say that A's expertise con-
tributed to the gain, unless one argues that A was wise to acquire a widget at the time he did 
(an argument that can translate into A was wise to steal a widget at the time he did), A better 
response focuses on timing: A's benefit at the expense of B should be measured at (or area-
sonable time after) the time that A deprived B of the widget, not later. A's benefit is his ability 
to forego purchasing a widget to start his rental business. Any other rule allows B to delay a 
lawsuit in order to use A for risk free speculation. 
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rates; if he does not regain the subject matter, he is entitled to the 
market value of the subject matter at the time of the wrongful acqui-
sition or detention plus interest at market rates.83 For example, in 
Roberts the defendant would be ordered to restore the patents and 
pay for the use of the patents at the market value, measured by a 
reasonable royalty rate for any unrestricted and exclusive license. 
The market value would take into account the normal profits obtain-
able from the patent; any profits Sears earned over the royalty rate 
would be attributable to the efforts of Sears itself, and not to the 
patent. Indeed, this is the measure of recovery established by Con-
gress in 1946 for patent infringement actions. Ironically, this may be 
the actual result in the Roberts case.84 Similarly, in 0/well the plain-
83. The rule applies where a person is entitled to restitution from another because (i} by 
fraud, duress or other consciously tortious conduct the other has obtained a benefit at the 
expense of the claimant, or (ii) the other is a fiduciary to the claimant. If the defendant is an 
innocent converter, the rule should be modified slightly: if the plaintiff regains the lost interest, 
he is entitled to the actual profit made on the interest by the defendant up to the market value 
of its use. See generally Monaghan, Constructive Trust and Equitable Lien: Status ef the Con-
scious and the Innocent Wrongdoer in Equity, 38 U. DET. L.J. 10, 22-32 (1960). 
Noticeably absent from the rule I suggest is the plaintiff's ability to recover the sale pro-
ceeds obtained on the sale of the wrongfully appropriated interest by the defendant. See RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§§ 151-57 (1937). To the extent that the sale proceeds exceed the 
market value of the interest at the time of conversion (with interest on the amount), they are 
presumptively attributable to the defendant's contributions (marketing expertise, for example). 
Moreover, even if the resale proceeds reflect an augmented value not attributable to the plain-
tiff's contributions (the market has shifted in an unanticipated manner), the benefit held by the 
defendant at the expense of the plaintiff is still best reflected by the value of the misappropri-
ated interest of the time of the wrongful appropriation. The defendant has benefited to the 
extent that he did not have to buy the interest he took from the plaintiff at market rates at the 
time he acquired it. Any award in excess of the amount is, in essence, a penalty. See note 82 
supra. 
The rule is subject to the traditional exception for fluctuations in value. If the subject 
matter of the controversy is fluctuating in value because of the changing market conditions, 
courts may grant the claimant an amount equal to the highest value reached by the subject 
matter within a reasonable time after the wrongful taking. See, e.g., RESTATMENT OF RESTI-
TUTION § 151, Comment c (1937). The theory of such an exception is the following: the de-
fendant benefited at the plaintiff's expense to the extent that the defendant did not have to 
enter the market and purchase something equivalent to the stolen asset; if the market is fluctu-
ating, the defendant's benefit should be presumed to be the highest value within a reasonable 
period of time either before or after the taking. The theory should be distinguished from the 
reason for granting an exception for fluctuating value in damages recoveries (trover, for exam-
ple). In damage awards, which focus on a calculation of the loss to the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
should be awarded the highest value between the taking and a reasonable time for cover. See 
Weaver v. Commercial Sav. Bank, 222 Mich. 337, 192 N.W. 578 (1923); Baker v. Drake, 53 
N.Y. 211 (1873); C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES§ 48 (1935). 
84. Count three in the case, based on negligent misrepresentation, was admitted by all to 
support a damages remedy. See note 53 supra. The instruction on count three was as follows: 
However, if you decide in favor of the plaintiff only upon the third claim, then, one of the 
elements of the money damages to be considered by you may be the value of a reasonable 
royalty on the Quick Release wrenches sold by the defendant from the time of the con-
tract in question to the present. 
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 1980). The jury awarded one 
million dollars on the count. The awards on this count and the two other counts, also each one 
million dollars, were not cumulative. 
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tiff should have recovered the market value of the wrongful use of 
the machine. 
In most cases, of course, the restitutionary recovery under my 
approach would be equivalent to the damages recovery; each award 
would be calculated by an assessment of the market value of the 
misappropriated interest at the time it was taken. The standards 
would diverge, however, in the rare cases where (i) the defendant's 
market position is inferior to that of the average participant; (ii) the 
plaintiff is entitled to special damages;85 or (iii) the plaintiff suffered 
no actual damage. 86 The latter two exceptions are straightforward; 
the first exception deserves explanation. Assume that the bailee in 
my earlier hypothetical has a very poor credit rating. A restitution-
ary award would grant the plaintiff the ten dollars wrongfully taken 
as well as the value of the use of ten dollars (which is a function of 
the interest rate) computed as if the defendant borrowed the fund. 
Defendant's poor credit rating will be reflected in higher interest 
rates. Restitutionary theory should cause the defendant to return the 
plaintiff's ten dollars and the interest on the ten dollars that the de-
fendant would have had to pay to acquire use of the fund. Since 
plaintiff's damage remedy will be equal to ten dollars and interest 
calculated at the prevailing market interest rates (no account being 
taken of the defendant's credit rating), restitution would award the 
plaintiff a larger sum. 87 
85. Recovery on the two theories may differ if the plaintiff is able to allege and prove 
"special" damages. For example, the plaintiff in a direct action for damages is generally per-
mitted to recover, in addition to his lost investment, lost profits due to the fraud. See, e.g., 
Lowrey v. Dingmann, 251 Minn. 124, 86 N.W.2d 499 (1957). Professor Palmer argues that 
special damages should be recovered in connection with a restitution award, but he is not 
supported by a majority of the cases. I G. PALMER§ 3.9. Moreover, those cases that do not 
follow the majority involve a select type of special damages such as actual expenditures; lost 
profits are not recoverable. Id 
86. See, e.g., Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 221, 113 A.2d 136, 138 (1955). An in-
triguing example is contained in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 
(1977). A television news team taped the entire performance of a "human cannonball" act~ 
without consent and showed it on the news with favorable commentary. In an action for 
unlawful appropriation of plaintiff's "professional property," the Supreme Court held that the 
plaintiff could sue under Ohio law, and that the broadcast was not privileged under the first 
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. In a footnote, the Court added 
that "[i]t is possible, of course, that respondent's news broadcast increased the value of peti-
tioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest in seeing the act live. In these circum-
stances, petitioner would not be able to prove damages and thus would not recover." 433 U.S. 
at 575 n.12. The Supreme Court overlooked the plaintiff's right to restitution for unauthorized 
exploitation of his act. 
87. A difficult case arises when the credit rating of the defendant is so bad that he is effec-
tively excluded (no one will loan money at any rate to the errant bailee). How is the benefit 
valued? My tentative conclusion is that we must return to a modified version of the old rule: 
the plaintiff recovers all the profits minus the market value (if any) of the defendant's contribu-
tions. Cf. Brooks v. Conston, 364 Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950) (credit given for value of services 
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Support for the market value standard appears, surprisingly, in 
the Restatement of Restitution's discussion of the conversion of chat-
tels: 
In actions for restitution brought because of the conversion of chattels, 
the measure of restitution is the value of the chattels, together with, 
ordinarily, interest from the time of the conversion. . . . Nor is there 
restitution even for the direct products of the subject matter after the 
time fixed for the valuation of the subject matter, since the damages 
given are for the value of the subject matter at that time, including as 
an element of value the prospect of receiving such direct product. . . . 
Thus there is no right to an accounting for profits made from the sub-
ject matter after the time fixed for the computation of the value.88 
This language is not followed in the case law, 89 nor is it reflected in 
the Restatement's discussions of other types of subject matter (land, 
for example);90 indeed, it appears to be contrary to other language in 
the Restatement itself.91 The thrust of the position, however, is in 
accord with my suggested revision of the law of profit apportion-
ment.92 
The law of tracing provides an even starker illustration of a resti-
tutionary remedy operating outside the bounds of reason. Tracing 
originated in suits against trustees or other :fiduciaries. A beneficiary 
of wrongdoer; the profit, however, was not apportioned between those services and the misap-
propriated assets). 
88. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 157, Comment e (1937). The comment provides an 
illustration: 
A steals B's machinery and keeps it for a period of six months, at the end of which time, 
the price of machinery having risen, he sells it for a greater price than that which could 
have been obtained for it at the time of the theft. B now discovers the loss of his machin-
ery. A is under a duty of restitution to B for the value of the machinery at the time of the 
subsequent sale or for the sale price at B's election, with interest only from such time, or 
the value at the time when it was taken with interest from that time. A is under no duty to 
account to B far the profits made by its use. 
Id (emphasis added). 
89. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946). 
90. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 157, Comment d (1937). 
91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 151, Comment f(l937): "A person who 
tortiously has acquired, retained or disposed of another's property with knowledge that such 
conduct is wrongful is entitled to no profits therefrom." 
92. Also supporting such a standard are those cases that refuse to award recovery of profits 
made by the defendant as a result of a breach of contract. A typical case of this kind arises 
when the defendant contracts to provide certain goods or services but offers the same goods or 
services at a higher price to a third party. Friedmann, supra note 75, at 513. An award of 
damages reflects the value of the goods or services at the time of breach, and to the extent that 
the defendant can demonstrate that the goods or services were sold at a price higher than its 
market value he should keep the difference. Presumably, the difference will be attributable to 
the seller's negotiating or marketing skill, to his improvement of the goods, or to services prior 
to the new sale. But see note 82 supra. The defendant has benefited from the breach, but only 
at the expense of the plaintiff to the extent of the market value of goods or services which were 
denied the plaintiff. Professor Palmer, however, appears to favor recovery of profits in these 
circumstances unless the contract is one for personal services. I G. PALMER at 441-46. See 
also Dawson, Restitution or .Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 186-87 (1959). 
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entitled to the restitution of money or other property misappropri-
ated by a :fiduciary is permitted to assert a claim against any asset 
that is traceable to, or the product of, such money or property. The 
end result of tracing can be a decree for specific restitution of the 
traced asset, a decree imposing an equitable lien on the asset to se-
cure a money claim, a decree for subrogation to a debt or charges on 
property otherwise discharged with the traceable funds, or a simple 
money judgment for the value of the traced asset. After restitution 
was drawn out from its historic origins in equity, tracing came to be 
used in other cases of wrongful acquisition, such as conversion or 
fraud.93 Now we find cases in which tracing is used as a remedy for 
mistake or breach of contract. 94 
Currently, tracing is advantageous to a plaintiff (that is, it ex-
pands recovery options) in four situations: (1) tracing gives the 
claimant priority over general creditors when a wrongdoer is insol-
vent;95 (2) tracing allows a recovery from an innocent third person 
(but not a bona fide purchaser) who receives a traced asset;96 (3) trac-
ing enables a claimant to reach assets exempt from creditors, such as 
homestead property;97 and ( 4) tracing permits a claimant to recover 
more than he has lost when the traced asset is more valuable than 
the misappropriated funds or property. 98 The fourth situation may 
occur in combination with any of the first three. For example, a 
claimant can argue for specific restitution of a traced asset found in 
the insolvent estate of the wrongdoer even when the asset is worth 
93. See, e.g., Nebraska Natl. Bank v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 546, 71 N.W. 294 (1897) (conver-
sion); American Sugar-Ref. Co. v. Fancher, 145 N.Y. 552, 40 N.E. 206 (1895) (fraud). 
94. In re Berry, 147 F. 208 (2d Cir. 1906) (mistake); Clark v. McCleery, 115 Iowa 3, 87 
N.W. 696 (1901) (contract); Matthews v. Crowder, 111 Tenn. 737, 69 S.W. 779 (1902) (con-
tract). 
95. See, e.g., In re Kountze Bros., 79 F.2d 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 640 (1935). 
The Bankruptcy Code excludes from the bankrupt estate property "to the extent of any equita-
ble interest in such property that the debtor does not hold." 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (Supp. III 
1979). The Senate Report indicates that the term "equitable interest" includes claims based on 
constructive trust. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-84 (1978), reprinted in (1978] U.S. 
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5868-70. 
96. For example, if the wrongdoer has used plaintiff's funds to pay the premiums on a life 
~ insurance policy, and the wrongdoer dies, the plaintiff can claim any policy proceeds paid to a 
named beneficiary. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 
194 N.W. 548 (1923); Shaler v. Trowbridge, 28 N.J. Eq. 595 (1877). See generally Note, Fol-
lowing Misappropriated Funds into L!fe Insurance Policies, 4 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 239 (1930). 
97. E.g., American Ry. Express Co. v. Houle, 169 Minn. 209, 210 N.W. 889 (1926); Warsco 
v. Oshkosh Sav. & Trust Co., 190 Wis. 87, 208 N.W. 886 (1926); Jones v. Carpenter, 90 Fla. 
407, 106 So. 127 (1925). Similarly, statutes protecting insurance proceeds from the claims of 
the insured's creditors do not prevent claims against the insurance proceeds based on tracing. 
See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 194 N.W. 548 (1923). 
98. See, e.g., Flannery v. Flannery Bolt Co., 108 F.2d 531 (3d Cir. 1939); Brooks v. Con-
ston, 364 Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950). 
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more than his actual loss. Professor Palmer, arguing that an interest 
created by equity "should be adapted so as to achieve equity", would 
not generally allow relief beyond the plaintiff's actual loss in the first 
three situations.99 But support for his position in the case law is 
sparse. Nevertheless, his uneasiness with the unthinking extension 
of the equitable remedy is sound. Indeed, tracing should be re-
stricted further than his position would allow. Other than in cases 
involving actual fiduciaries as defendants, tracing cannot be justified 
under any of the situations noted above. Although the restitutionary 
remedies of constructive trust and equitable lien are reasonably em-
ployed outside of their origins in fiduciary situations, the concept of 
tracing is not. 
There are several reasons why tracing should be abandoned 
outside of the law of fiduciary relations. First, tracing provides an 
advantage to an injured party based on the fortuity of whether the 
misappropriated asset can be followed into a second asset. Courts 
discriminate between injured parties suffering equivalent injury and 
loss based on the fact that one of them has the good fortune to dis-
cover and prove that the defendant possesses a traceable asset. For 
example, assume that the defendant has stolen two cars owned re-
spectively by A and B. A's car is exchanged for a third car; B's car is 
exchanged for money which is dissipated on necessities. The defen-
dant has no other assets and no other creditors or claimants. A (if 
prompt) is awarded the third car and B gets a general judgment that 
cannot be satisfied. This is true even if B can argue and prove that if 
the defendant had stolen only one car, the car would have been ex-
changed for money and dissipated, and that, therefore, B's car was 
essential to the exchange of A's car for the third car. Moreover, B 
gets nothing if he can prove that the defendant flipped a coin in de-
ciding which stolen car would be resold. Aside from the obvious 
inequity of the discrimination, this counter-intuitive result induces 
courts to reach out on tenuous factual inferences or outright fictions 
to provide injured persons with the benefits associated with trac-
ing.100 The better result, in which A and B have equal rights to exe-
99. I G. PALMER at 185-87, 189-91. See also Monaghan,supra note 83, at 17 ("[W]here the 
beneficiary of the [life insurance] policy is the wife or the minor child, recovery should be 
limited to a charge against the proceeds for the amount of the money wrongfully used in 
premium payments."). 
100. See Taft,A Defense of a Limited Use of the Swollen Assets Theory Where Money Has 
Wrongfully Been Mingled with Other Money, 39 CoLUM. L. REV. 172, 177 n.13, 181-82 nn.26-
28 (1939). Consider, for example, the legal fictions associated with tracing into and out of a 
commingled fund. Compare Knatchbull v. Hallett (In re Hallett's Estate), 13 Ch. D. 696 
(1879) with Hertslet v. Oatway (In re Oatway), [1903] 2 Ch. 356. The Knatchbull case is the 
origin of the rule of J essel's bag: if a wrongdoer commingles his own fund with the misappro-
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cute on the third car, would follow if tracing were eliminated. 
Second, tracing is misused when it advantages a select group of 
claimants for no principled reason other than historical continuity. 
Bankruptcy laws should allocate explicitly the priorities of all inter-
ested parties. If the statutes are silent, courts should look to the poli-
cies of the bankruptcy provisions, not ancient restitutionary doctrine, 
to allow priorities. Similarly, laws exempting property from credi-
tors (homesteads, for example), should, consistent with their policy 
foundations, deal explicitly or be used implicitly to deal with all ap-
propriate claims. Currently, rights created by the laws of bankruptcy 
and exempt property are subject to equitable tracing claims that, in 
effect, alter the intrinsic statutory schemes. Courts hold that these 
equitable claims have a unique status in bankruptcy actions101 and 
against exempt property102 when the statutes are silent on the issue. 
Courts often fail to give the policy foundations of the statutes ade-
quate play, when they leap to apply old remedies. Moreover, legisla-
tures that amend such statutes after courts have construed them as 
subject to equitable tracing tend to accept blindly the existence and 
need for the tracing remedy. Instead, a homestead exemption law, 
based on a state policy of protecting its citizens from having their 
families thrust out of their home by creditors, 103 should also defeat 
the claims of those tracing into the homestead assets. 104 Similarly, 
the outcome of a tracing claim against an insolvent estate, is best 
determined by reference to the legislature's policies embodied in the 
bankruptcy statute, not by the common law of restitution. 105 
priated funds and thereafter withdraws money from the fund, courts presume that the wrong-
doer withdrew his own funds first. However, if the withdrawal can be traced into an asset held 
by the wrongdoer, the Oatway case reverses the presumption. The wrongdoer is presumed to 
have withdrawn the victim's funds for the investment. See Townsend, Constructive Trusts and 
Bank Collections, 39 YALE L.J. 980, 982-84 (1930). The Restatement of Restitution attempted 
to eliminate the tracing fictions, but with limited success. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 
§§ 211-12 (1937). 
101. See note 95 supra. 
102. See note 97 supra. 
103. See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (1950). 
104. I would make an exception to this rule if the statute provides that all judgments based 
on fraud or tort can be levied on the homestead property. 
105. At present the law is unclear on whether a claimant can recover more than his loss 
through tracing at the expense of the general creditors. Compare Smith v. Township of Au 
Gres, 150 F. 257 (6th Cir. 1906) with Kemp v. Elmer Co., 56 F.2d 657 (S.D. Cal. 1932). Profes-
sor Palmer favors limiting the recovery to actual loss. l G. PALMER at 183-84. His view is 
contrary to the Restatement of Restitution § 202, Co=ent c (1937). For an attack on the use 
of equitable devices to undermine the policy of modem bankruptcy legislation, see McLaugh-
lin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 341, 389-90 (1927). 
In one area, Congress has explicitly ordered the priorities of restitutionary claims relative 
to other claims to the bankrupt estate. A claim for rescission of a purchase or sale of a security 
of the debtor is subordinated "to all claims and interests that are senior or equal to the claims 
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Third, tracing penalizes the defendant for his contributions to the 
gain to the extent that the recovery is more than the market value of 
the misappropriated interest. In the example of the second sticky-
.fingered bailee discussed above, an alternative route for the plaintiff 
in claiming the twenty-six dollars of gross pro.fit is through a request 
for tracing from the misappropriated fund to the subsequent invest-
ment product of thirty-six dollars. Such a reward cannot be justified 
on the ground of recovering the benefit gained by the defendant as a 
result of the wrongful taking. It is rather a penalty equivalent to the 
value of the defendant's personal contribution to the gain. 106 
Whether or not such a penalty is appropriate is a separate issue, but 
appropriate or not, punitive damages should not be disguised as res-
titution. 
Fourth, tracing assets to third parties who are not bonaftde pur-
chasers provides an overly simplistic and often harsh answer to a 
complex problem that is best handled through other doctrines. 107 
This practice can be justified ( outside of fiduciary misconduct) when 
the claimant seeks the return of a specific, identifiable asset from the 
third party in specie. The legal policies protecting the inviolability of 
title and other ownership interests support the result. 108 Of course, 
one does not need the doctrine of tracing to get recovery in such 
cases; the doctrines (and their statutory offshoots) of ejectment, re-
plevin and detinue, and specific restitution in equity suffice. The 
claimant seeking a money judgment should look solely to the trans-
or interest represented by such security." 11 U.S.C. § 5 lO(b) (Supp. III 1979). See generally In 
re Stirling Homex Corp., 591 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979). 
106. The co=on argument made in favor of tracing into the appreciated asset is that "the 
wrongdoer should not be permitted to keep the profit . . . since it resulted from the wrongful 
use of the claimant's money .... " Scott, Following the Res and Sharing the Product, 66 HARV. 
L. REV. 872, 873 (1953). The argument overlooks the fact that the defendant's effort may have 
substantially contributed to the profit. This effort can often be valued, and is indistinguishable 
from the situation in which a wrongdoer mingles money of his own with that of the claimant. 
Yet the latter case leads to a different recovery. 
Where the wrongdoer had mingled money of the claimant with money of his own and 
with the mingled fund has acquired property, the claimant is entitled to an equitable lien 
upon the property, or ifhe prefers, he may have a pro rata share of the property. He is not 
entitled to the whole of the property .... 
Id 
107. Tracing, as used in restitution, denotes a change in the form of the misappropriated 
asset. Accordingly, the discussion in the text does not deal with cases in which an intended 
succession to property by an inter vivos gift, testamentary disposition, or intestate succession 
was wrongfully prevented, resulting in the enrichment of individuals who were not party to the 
wrong. See, e.g., Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 211 S.W.2d 559 (1948). Discussion of these 
problems must await a later day. 
108. The law favors the right of an individual whose property has been taken to recover 
that specific property if he chooses. Otherwise, the law would support, in essence, a right of 
private eminent domain; the plaintiff could be forced to settle for compensation in lieu of the 
misappropriated asset. 
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feror who wrongfully acquired the property at the expense of the 
claimant. The judgment against the transferor may be for the full 
value of the appropriated interest or for the value of the last use if 
the specific asset is sought and recovered from the transferee. If the 
transferor is solvent there is no need to involve the innocent trans-
feree. Moreover, if a judgment is levied against the transferee, the 
culpable transferor may escape liability completely because he may 
be immune from a suit for indemnification. 109 
The hard case, of course, appears when the transferor is bank-
rupt. A plaintiff unsatisfied with specific restitution can obtain a full 
money recovery only if allowed to proceed against the transferee. 
The plaintiff's urging should be resisted. If the transferor is bank-
rupt, the claimant should be satisfied through the operation of the 
bankruptcy laws, including those that augment the estate by voiding 
select pre-bankruptcy proceeding transfers by the bankrupt party. 110 
The claimant should not be given a specified preference on assets 
from third parties that the bankrupt estate could otherwise claim, 
nor should the claimant be able to get assets from third parties that 
the bankrupt estate could not claim. In other words, the extent of 
recovery in such a situation should be decided explicitly by a legisla-
ture ( or by courts extrapolating from the policies of the bankruptcy 
statutes) within the context of the bankruptcy laws. On the other 
hand, if the transferor cannot be found (!.e., process cannot be 
served in any domestic jurisdiction) or the bankruptcy laws other-
wise do not apply though the defendant is insolvent (e.g. , there are 
not enough creditors), perhaps the claimant should be entitled to a 
judgment against the transferee. In these select cases, between the 
transferee and the claimant the claimant appears, by virtue of supe-
rior equities, to have a better right to the traced asset. 111 Tracing 
provides, in essence, a voidable transfer rule when the bankruptcy 
laws are not applicable. In this context, however, the claimant 
should be limited to the amount of his loss. 112 
For all these reasons, I favor eliminating the use of the tracing 
fiction other than in select cases involving actual fiduciaries (and in 
109. For example, suppose A converts a ring owned by B. A has twin daughters (C and 
D) and on their birthday he gives each a ring; the one he legally acquired he gives to C, and 
the one he has stolen he gives to D. Both daughters sell the rings for fair value. B can sue D 
for either the value of the ring at the time of conversion by A or for the sale proceeds held by 
D. D cannot sue A for indemnification. 
I JO. See, e.g., I I U.S.C. § 550 (Supp. II 1978). 
I I 1. Cf. Wilson v. Todd, 217 Ind. 183, 26 N.E.2d 1003 (1940) (plaintiff's funds used to 
discharge a lien on land held by wrongdoer and spouse of tenants in common; subrogation 
ordered against spouse's interest even though she had no knowledge of the wrongdoing). 
112. See l G. PALMER at 224-25. 
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cases involving third parties when either the transferor cannot be 
found or bankruptcy is unavailable), rather than limiting the tracing 
recovery according to the specific circumstances of the case, as Pro-
fessor Palmer prefers. Limited tracing is permissible in select fiduci-
ary cases where the fiduciary has a duty to manage and maintain 
trust assets. No similar duty exists for tortfeasors, contract breakers, 
and the like. This duty to manage supports the inference that ex-
changed assets would have been owned by the beneficiary absent the 
wrongful appropriation, if the beneficiary had properly carried out 
his responsibilities. In a sense, the fiduciary's management skills 
have also been wrongly withheld from the benefi.ciary.113 In fiduci-
ary cases it therefore appears just to award restitution of the product 
of these management skills wrongfully withheld as well as the misap-
propriated property.114 But a rule limiting tracing to the fiduciary 
context appropriately adjusts restitution theory to its current role, 
and has the added benefit of narrowing considerably the number of 
pases in which courts must discern the content of Jessel's bag or 
Oatway's trust fund. 115 
My brief discussion of problems with the current scope of restitu-
tionary relief is not exhaustive. Other authors have suggested that 
other restitutionary doctrines in other contexts have outgrown useful 
limits. 116 The scope and purpose of restitution need re-examina-
113. Tracing may not apply to fiduciary misconduct if the fiduciary relationship is strictly 
limited by express agreement. For example, if a fiduciary is entrusted only with the possession 
of a chattel and has no power to use or sell the chattel to gain profits (like the bailee in my 
earlier hypothetical), then a fiduciary who does so use the chattel should be treated like a 
simple converter. The legal situation can become complicated if the fiduciary has specified 
management responsibilities and he misappropriates the beneficiary's property, generating 
profits from investments that are outside the scope of the fiduciary contract. 
114. In my hypothetical dealing with the sticky-fingered bailees, the second bailee, if recast 
as a fiduciary with fund management responsibilities, wrongfully withheld not only the ten 
dollar fund, but also his personal services. The bailor should therefore get the entire profit as 
well as the misappropriated fund. Allowing the beneficiary to trace into the product of the 
misappropriated fund with apportionment of the product only to reflect property contributions 
made by the fiduciary achieves the same result. 
Tracing in fiduciary cases, however, should be limited to situations in which the remedy 
enables a claimant to recover more than he has lost because the traced asset is more valuable 
than the misappropriated property. The remedy, for the reasons noted in the text, should not 
give a claimant priority over general creditors when the wrongdoer is insolvent, permit recov-
ery from an innocent third party, or enable a claimant to reach assets otherwise exempt from 
creditors. 
llS. See note 100 supra. 
116. E.g., Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 115 (1977). Posner and Rosenfield favor a rule 
imposing the loss from contracts discharged through impossibility, impracticability, or frustra-
tion of purpose on the party that is the superior risk bearer (the party who can, by purchasing 
insurance or otherwise, take the least costly steps to avoid the loss). · Criticizing the rule that 
awards a contractor the value of materials ''worked into" a house prior to a total fire, they 
argue that "[t]he proper measure of benefit is the value to the homeowner during the interval 
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tion. While most recognize and applaud the separation of the princi-
ples of unjust enrichment from the early foundations, the irony of 
the evolution is that only the restrictive vestiges of these foundations 
have been systematically disregarded; those vestiges that support 
broad relief-overbroad in new contexts-remain and are uncriti-
cally accepted. 117 
before the fire deprived him of the value of the work. Any greater award would, by conferring 
a windfall on the contractor, undermine the determination that he was the superior risk 
bearer." Id But see 2 G. PALMER at 119-23 (arguing for a rule more beneficial to the contrac• 
tor - the bargained-for-performance rule). 
117. Professor Dawson explained the phenomenon this way: "[A] general principle 
prohibiting enrichment through another's loss appears first as a convenient explanation ofspc• 
cific results. . . . Yet once the idea has been formulated as a generalization, it has the peculiar 
faculty of inducing quite sober citizens to jump right off the dock." J. DAWSON, supra note 3, 
at 8. 
